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Abstract
Deep Neural Network has been found vulnerable re-
cently. A kind of well-designed inputs, which called adver-
sarial examples, can lead the networks to make incorrect
predictions. Depending on the different scenarios, goals
and capabilities, the difficulty to generate the attack is dif-
ferent. For example, generating a targeted attack is more
difficult than a non-targeted attack, a universal attack is
more difficult than a non-universal attack, a transferable at-
tack is more difficult than a nontransferable one. The ques-
tion is: Is there exist an attack that can survival in the most
harsh adversity to meet all these requirements. Although
many cheap and effective attacks have been proposed, this
question is still not completely solved over large models and
large scale dataset. In this paper, we learn a universal map-
ping from the sources to the adversarial examples. These
examples can fool classification networks into classifying
all of them to one targeted class. Besides, they are also
transferable between different models. Our code is released
at:
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Network has outperformed many previous
techniques in a wide domain. Their high accuracy and fast
speed make them to be widely deployed in applications. De-
spite these great successes, it has been found vulnerable to
the adversarial examples: the output of the networks can be
manipulated by adding a kind of meticulously crafted sub-
tle perturbations to the input data. This property is shown to
be generally exist. Whether in the tasks of computer vision,
like classification [24], objection detection [26], semantic
segmentation [4] or in tasks of Natural Language Process-
ing [9] and Reinforcement Learning [7].
In the classification task, the adversarial attacks aim to
manipulate the network to misclassify. Previous works have
proved generating this kind of adversarial examples can be
very cheap and effective [6]. But the difficulty of the at-
tack varies with the adversarial goals, perturbation scope
and adversary knowledge. To put it clearly, we taxonimize
Figure 1: The taxonomy of adversarial attacks
the threat models by different goals, adversarys knowledge
and perturbation scope. The taxonomy is shown in Figure
1.
• Adversarial Goals
- Non-targeted misclassification forces the victim model
to incorrectly classify the input into an arbitrary class.
- Targeted misclassification forces the victim model to
incorrectly classify all the inputs to a specific targeted class.
• Adversarial Knowledge
- White-box attacks assume threat model knows every-
thing about the victim model, including the network archi-
tecture and the training dataset.
- Black-box attacks assume threat model can’t get access
to the victim model. It only knows the standard output of the
network, like the labels of the inputs and the corresponding
scores. But if the adversarial examples are transferable, a
white-box attack can be transferred to a black-box model.
• Perturbation Scope
- Individual attacks solve the optimization problem for
each single input. The perturbations for each clean input
are all different.
- Universal attacks denote the attacks that are able to
learn a universal mapping relation between the inputs and
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adversarial examples, but don’t need to solve the optimiza-
tion problem for each input.
In Figure 1, the difficulty of the attacks increases with
axes x, y, z. In this paper, we mainly explore how to pro-
duce attacks under the strictest conditions, which is corre-
spond to point (2,2,2) in Figure 1, denoting the transferable,
universal and targeted attacks.
In the following, we first discuss related work in sec-
tion 2. We then propose low frequency fooling image in
section 3. We introduce our method of producing adversar-
ial examples in section 4, corresponding experiments and
comparisons are provided in section 5. We provide some
discussions and analyses in section 6.
2. Related work
All the attacks can be diveded Some methods can be di-
rectly deployed in a black-box attack since they don’t re-
quire gradients. For example, Chen et al. [2] used symmet-
ric difference gradient to estimate the gradient and Hessian.
Su et al. [23] utilized differential evolution to find the opti-
mal solution. Zhao et al. [27] built a generator to map the
latent vector to the adversarial examples, and used search
algorithms to search the effective noise. However, all these
methods have to compromise on adversarial goals or per-
turbation scope. [2] has to optimize on every single image.
[23] aimed to generate adversarial examples by only mod-
ifying one pixel and only experimented on small images.
[27] is non-targeted attack.
Most other methods have to get access to the victim
model, but due to the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples proposed by Papernot et al.[20], they are able to be
transferred to other victim models [22], [6], [21], [16], [1]
or even the black-box services [14]. However, it’s still hard
to ensure good transferability when considering the distor-
tion of adversarial examples, time consumption and targeted
attack. [24] first used L-BFGS method to generate the ad-
versarial examples, but it’s time-consuming. [6] and its ex-
tended methods [22], [11], [3], [25] performed only one step
gradient at each pixel to speed up the optimization. [21]
computed Jacobian matrix of given sample trying to make
most significant changes with smallest perturbations. [16]
further reduced the intensity of perturbation by considering
the classifier is linearized around the samples. [1] defined
a new objective function to describe the distance between
sources and adversarial examples for better optimized the
distance and penalty term. [14] discovered targeted attacks
are harder to transfer than non-targeted attacks and opti-
mized on ensemble deep neural networks to improve trans-
ferability. However, all these optimization-based methods
are individual attacks, which means they have to optimize
on each single source image. [15] first found the universal
perturbation over large dataset but it is unable to deployed
to targeted attacks. In this paper, we show the existence of
(a) fooling image (b) visualized image
Figure 2: The comparison of fooling image and visualized
image of class ’starfish’ in VGG19. Both images maximize
the activation of the last fully connected layer before soft-
max.
a universal mapping form the source images to the trans-
ferable and targeted adversarial examples with small distor-
tions.
3. Low frequency fooling image
Before going into the adversarial examples, let’s discuss
about the fooling images. This nomenclature is adopted
from [17], which means the images that are meaningless
to humans, but the networks classify them to certain classes
with high confidences.
For producing a fooling image, we solve the following
optimization problem:
If = argmaxP (y|If ) (1)
where If denotes the fooling image, P (y|If ) denotes the
classifier’s confidence of the targeted label y when inputting
image If . If the neural networks are differentiable with re-
spect to their inputs. We can use derivatives to iteratively
tweak the input towards the goal. The way to produce fool-
ing images very like the way to visualize the network [19].
The difference is the target layer and constraint. Neural net-
work visualization optimizes the layers which it aims to vi-
sualize. And for recognition, neural network visualization
will add extra constraints to this optimization problem, forc-
ing the goal to lie in the low frequency space. A contrast of
fooling image and network visualization result is shown in
Figure 2. A question is why the networks will naturally pro-
duce the high frequency unrecognizable noise. Odena et al.
[18] indicated they may be closely related to the structure
of the networks, especially the strided deconvolutional lay-
ers and the pooling operations. Since Odena et al. [18]]
pointed out the deconvolution operations are the root of the
grid effect, one possible interpretation is when we lever-
age the gradients going backward from the targeted label,
as what we do when solving Eqn. (1), every convolution
layer in the network will serve as a deconvolutional layer.
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Therefore, the gradients will have to go through excess de-
convolutional layers (generally 2 or 3 deconvolutional lay-
ers are able to produce grid effect). The grid effect is se-
quentially magnified by these deconvolutional layers, and
finally become these high frequency noises.
If these high frequency noises are closely related to the
structure of the networks, are the low frequency fooling im-
ages can be unrelated to the structure of networks, thus be-
ing more general and transferable than these high frequency
ones? To answer this question, we tried several methods to
constrain the high frequency noises in the fooling images.
1. Transformation Robustness (TR) constrains high fre-
quencies by applying small transformations to the fooling
images before optimization. Here, we rotate, scale and jit-
ter the images. The constrained optimization process can be
expressed as:
Itrf = argmaxP (y| T (Itrf )) (2)
where T denotes the composition of the specific transfor-
mations.
2. Decorrelation (DR) decorrelated the relationship be-
tween the neighbour pixels. Here, we do it by using gradient
descent in the Fourier basis, as what [19] did to visualize the
network. It can be expressed as:
θ = argmaxP (y|F(θ))
Idrf = F(θ)
(3)
where F denotes Fourier transform.
3. Transformation Robustness and Decorrelation (TR
and DR) are able to combine together to generate fooling
images, which is expressed as:
θ = argmaxP (y| T (F(θ)))
Itr&drf = F(θ)
(4)
4. Gradient optimized Compositional Pattern Producing
Network (Gradient-CPPN) uses CPPN to map the source
images to the adversarial examples. CPPN is a neural net-
work that map a position of the image to it’s color. Thus,
the frequency of the outputted fooling image is related to
the architecture of CPPN. The simpler the structure of the
network, the lower the frequency of getting images. This
method optimizes CPPN parameters by the gradients of the
victim model, which can be expressed as:
CPPN(Mp) = argmaxP (y| CPPN(Mp))
Igcppnf = CPPN(Mp)
(5)
where Mp is a 2-D position map.
5. CPPN encoded Evolutionary Algorithms (EA-CPPN)
is proposed by [17]. This method uses CPPN encoded im-
age to represent genomes and uses EA to optimize.
We choose VGG16 as our victim model to train the fool-
ing images and test the results on Clarifai.com, which is
a black-box image classification service. We shown some
examples in Figure 3. We find that consistent with our hy-
pothesis, low-frequency images can fool Clarifai.com into
classifying them as targeted or related classes, while high-
frequency noises are fail to fool the system. In all these
low-frequency images, gradient optimized CPPN performs
better than the other methods. As our goal is to gen-
erate the transferable targeted adversarial examples, these
low-frequency fooling images are not enough. In the next
section, we will introduce how we leverage these low-
frequency images to generate transferable targeted adver-
sarial examples. For the convenience, in the following,
we refer to these constrained low-frequency fooling images
as Ilf , and unconstrained high-frequency fooling image as
Ihf .
4. Generating adversarial examples
4.1. Method
For generating the adversarial examples, we aim at map-
ping the distribution of the source images to the targeted
adversarial distribution. The samples in this distribution
should maintain the similarity with the source images in
the low level (pixel level), but have the similar high-level
features with fooling images. These high-level features pre-
serve the attribution of the fooling images to ensure the suc-
cess of the attack and also, we assume, the low-frequency
property to ensure the transferability. We prove this as-
sumption by comparing the high-level features of fooling
images with different frequencies. We find the mean and
variance of different distributions cluster together, which
denotes the Ilf have some specific properties to ensure their
transferabilities.
We build a conditional image generation function to shift
the original source image distribution to inherit Ilf distribu-
tions’ properties. Put formally, let Is and If be the source
images and fooling images that sampled from two observed
distributions q(Is) and q(If ), and Ia be the targeted adver-
sarial examples. Our goal is to learn the conditional distri-
bution q(Is−f |If ) to satisfy:
Ia = argmax
Iavq(Is−f |If )
P (y|Ia) (6)
where Is−f denotes the sample produced by endowing Is
with the properties of If .
We build an an encoder-decoder convolutional neural
network to serve as the conditional distribution generator.
We call it Fooling Transfer Net (FTN). The details of FTN
is described in the next section.
4323
(a) naive (b) TR
(c) DR (d) TR and DR
(e) Gradient-CPPN (f) EA-CPPN
Figure 3: Some samples of high-frequency fooling image:
3a and low-frequency fooling images generated by differ-
ent methods: 3b-3f. The classes following the images are
predicted by Clarifai.com.
4.2. Network structure
Inspired by the image-to-image translation [12], [13] and
style transfer task [5]. FTN is built with an encoder E and
an AdaIN decoder D. We learn the properties of distribu-
tion q(If ) from its’ high-level representations in the victim
model, which are denoted as φi(Iˆf ), where Iˆf v q(If ) and
i denotes the targeted layer of the victim model.
The encoder E consists a sequence of convolutional lay-
ers and several residual blocks to encode the source im-
ages to a latent vector. The AdaIN decoder is made of two
layers AdaIN Residual Blocks followed by several decon-
volutional layers. AdaIN Residual Blocks are the residual
blocks with adaptive instance normalization layers, will first
normalize the activations of a sample in each channel to
have a zero mean and unit variance and then scale it with
learned scalars and biases. In our translation network, the
scalars and biases are got from the means and variances of
φi(Iˆf ).
Specifically, we extract the φi(Iˆf ) in a pretrained clas-
sifier, and put them through several fully connected layers
to get a certain number of (depending on the number of en-
coded features) scalars and biases. These scalars and biases
are then applied to do the affine transformation to the scaled
latent code. Here, we aims at extracting the latent content
representations from the source images using the encoder
and extracting the class-specific representation from fooling
image. Then we shift the latent content code using class-
specific representation. In this way, we hope to remain the
content information of the original images but adjust them
to the targeted attribution.
We supervise the network by the original source images
Is and the fooling images high-level representation φi(Iˆf ).
Is constrain the output to maintain maximum content infor-
mation and φi(Iˆf ) constrain the output to have the similar
high-level representations with the fooling images. An il-
lustration of FTN is shown in Figure 4.
4.3. Loss function
We constrain the network by three loss function, the con-
tent loss Lc, the representation loss Lrep, and total variance
loss Ltv .
The content loss is used to keep content similarity be-
tween the adversarial examples and the source images. We
use the structural similarity (SSIM) index as our content
loss function. SSIM is method to predict the perceived qual-
ity of the images. In our contrast experiment, it performs
better than traditional L2 loss function.
The representation loss constraint the output adversar-
ial examples to have similar high-level representations with
fooling images in the pretrained classifier. In this paper,
we choose VGG19 as our classifier and empirically, choose
layer relu52, relu53 and relu54 as the targeted representa-
tion. The representation is expressed as:
Lrep = 1
CjHjWj
‖φj(Ia)− φj(If )‖22 (7)
The total variance loss applies a total variation regular-
ization to punish the reconstruction noise.
The total loss of the network is expressed as:
Ltotal = LSSIM + γLrep + λLtv (8)
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Figure 4: An illustration of FTN, the blue layers denote AdaIN Residual Blocks, the orange layers denote convolutional
layers, the brown layers denote fully-connected layers.
where γ and λ are the weight constants of Lrep and Ltv .
5. Experiment
Models: In the paper, we choose a classic classifica-
tion model: VGG19 as our training victim model and test
the transferability on the other more delicate classifica-
tion models, like Inception-v3, ResNet-18, ResNet-50 and
Densenet. We denote them as validation victim models.
There have two points we need to clarify. Firstly, we haven’t
put a lot of energy on the selection of training victim model.
That’s because relevant experiments have been done by
many previous works [6], [14], [8]. And the conclusion
has seemed to be uncontroversial: the adversarial examples
trained on the more basic models are equipped with more
transferability. We don’t think our method can be an ex-
ception of it. Thus, doing this comparison will be time-
consuming, not so meaningful and also distract the readers.
Secondly, previous works have shown that using ensemble-
based approach can get higher attack success rate [14], [25].
But we only trained our net on a single victim model. That’s
because we also think our method has no reason to be an
exception. Training on a single victim model can preserve
more test models to prove the transferability. We welcome
the reports that showing our method will be an exception of
the previous conclusion.
Dataset: FTN is trained on ILSVRC 2012 classification
training set and tested on its’ validation set. Target: We
choose attribution ’starfish’ as our default targeted class. We
choose this class cause it is almost impossible to tangle with
other classes. The features of starfish are distinct from most
other objects. Thus it can avoid the circumstance that the
model naturally misclassify the source images to the tar-
geted class and then overestimate the performance of our
proposed method. The targeted attack of the other classes
can be checked in the appendix.
Measure: We measure our results by two important fac-
tors: transferability and distortion. The transferability is
measured by the transfer success rate, which means the per-
centage of the generated adversarial examples are correctly
classified to the targeted label by validation victim models.
The distortion describes the difference between the gener-
ated adversarial examples and the source images. We mea-
sured the distortion by root mean square deviation (RMSD),
which is computed as: d =
√
1
n‖Ia − Is‖22. We also use
the ratio of transfer success rate and distortion, which is de-
noted as RTD as a measure to compare different methods.
Put formally, it is calculated as:
RTD =
transfer success rate
RMSD
∗ 100 (9)
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Inception-v3 Resnet-18 Resnet-50 Densenet Clarifai.com
Niave 1% 2% 1% 1% 0%
TR 67% 79% 74% 76% 51%
DR 72% 76% 83% 75% 62%
TR&DR 78% 81% 78% 83% 67%
Gradient-CPPN 96% 94% 91% 93% 86%
EA-CPPN 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
Table 1: Comparison of fooling images
Figure 5: The adversarial examples generated by FTN with different fooling images
5.1. Low-frequency fooling image
In the paper, we proposed low-frequency fooling images
and FTN to transfer the source images with them. In this
section, we aim to prove Ilf are more transferable than Ihf
and FTN can maintain this transferability.
We have given the examples that Ilf are more transfer-
able than Ihf above. Here, we do the comprehensive ex-
periment to prove this result. We compare the five high-
frequency-constrained methods: CPPN Gradient, CPPN
EA, DR, TR, DR+TR and the direct gradient ascent method
with no constrain for high-frequency gradients. All the re-
sults are trained on training victim model and tested on vali-
dation victim models. The transfer success rate of randomly
selected 100 samples are shown in Table 1. We can see
high-frequency constrained methods generally perform bet-
ter than direct gradient ascent method, and CPPN Gradient
method is the best in them.
And then, we will show FTN can maintain the transfer-
ability of Ilf . In other words, using more transferable fool-
ing images in FTN can generate more transferable adver-
sarial examples than the others. For the sake of fairness, we
adjust the hyper-parameters for every methods to get their
best effects. The ratio of transfer success rate and distortion
is shown in Table 2 and the visual comparison is shown in
Figure 5. We can see the better class images can contribute
to generate more transferable or less distorted adversarial
examples for the same model.
5.2. FTN
AdaIN normalization We design the AdaIN Residual
Blocks in FTN for shifting the latent source distribution by
the property of latent class distribution. But in ablation ex-
periment, we see the results are not substantially different.
In contrast, the chooses of targeted representation layers and
the loss functions play more decisive roles. However, we
find the AdaIN residual really help the training process to
converge more quickly and the setting of hyper-parameters
more easily. The AdaIN Residual Blocks allow more flexi-
bility of the decisive hyper-parameter γ, which denotes the
weight of representation loss relative to content loss.
Selection of representations We’ve tried many feasi-
ble combination of the targeted representation layers in
VGG19. In style transfer, the style representations are gen-
erally chose as the activations from low to high. But for
generating adversarial examples, the lower representations
will endow more superficial similarity between the adver-
sarial examples and fooling images instead of the semantic
features. We choose some typical selections and show them
in Figure 6.
Loss function For the content loss, we tried L2 loss
function, perceptual loss [10] and SSIM loss. We show the
visual comparison in figure[]. The SSIM loss generates the
best visual effect in them. For the representation loss, we
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RMSD Inception-v3 Resnet-18 Resnet-50 Densenet Clarifai.com
TR 10.13 3.94 4.34 4.65 4.21 3.00
DR 10.28 4.52 5.33 5.43 5.10 3.94
TR&DR 10.34 6.34 6.81 6.49 7.02 5.41
Gradient-CPPN 5.21 13.32 13.39 12.13 12.23 12.11
Table 2: FTN transferability comparisons using different fooling images
Figure 6: FTN supervised by different layers in VGG19. Content layer denotes the layer of source images in VGG19, style
layer denotes the layer of fooling images in VGG19.
tried many loss functions that might be better than simple
L2 loss (e.g. cosine similarity, KL divergence, a bunch of
discriminative nets). But unfortunately, none of them works
better than L2. Intuitively, we think there exists a better loss
function for the representations. We hope further researches
can find a better way than us.
5.3. Comparison with other methods
Different with most adversarial-examples-generating
methods, we learn the universal mapping in the paper in-
stead of doing optimization for every single image. For
fairly comparison, we degrade our method to the single im-
age when comparing with the methods that process one par-
ticular image every time. These methods include, FG, FGS,
Deepfool, JSMA and C&W attack. We do the optimization
on VGG19 model and test on validation victim models and
Clarifai.com. Clarifai.com is a black-box image classifica-
tion system, no one can get access to its’ dataset, network
structure and parameters, which is good to test the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples. As shown in Table 3,
our method can access higher transfer success rate than the
other methods for the targeted attack.
We also compare our method with another universal at-
tack [15]. The quantitive results are shown in Table 4.
6. Discussion
In this paper, we proposed low-frequency adversarial ex-
amples and proved it is more transferable than the high-
frequency ones. However, what low-frequency attacks
mean? Why they can be more transferable than the high-
frequency ones? In this section, we attempt to discuss and
answer these questions.
Firstly, we find low-frequency attacks and high-
frequency attacks are highly different. This difference not
only lay on the pixel image but also lay on the classifier
representations, which are decisive to the classification (al-
though they will be classified to the same class). This con-
clusion actually can be confirmed by the observation of dif-
ference between Ilf generated adversarial examples and Ihf
generated ones, as shown in Figure[]. Cause the generat-
ing processes are all the same except the change of class
images. But we still do the more rigorous experiments to
observe the difference between these representations. We
compare the representations of two kinds of fooling images
in VGG19 model. Our targeted representations are relu52,
relu53, relu54, which we find most effective to supervise
our model and most decisive to the final classification. We
compute the mean and variance of them and find the mean
and variance of the same kind of fooling image are highly
similar. This proves although they will be classified to the
same class, their high-dimensional features are different.
But what this difference means and how this differ-
ence cause the stronger transferability? For answering this
question, we analysis the low-frequency attacks and high-
frequency attacks on the manifold. In this way, we can
think the classification models learn the classified bound-
aries in a high-dimensional space. The traditional strategy[]
is learning a high-dimensional vector and add it to a source
image point. These methods constraint the vector can help
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RMSD Inception-v3 Resnet-18 Resnet-50 Densenet Clarifai.com
FG 3.56 1% 2% 1% 1% 0%
JSMA 3.21 2% 2% 0% 1% 0%
DeepFool 3.98 28% 33% 34% 31% 1%
C&W 4.55 2% 3% 2% 2% 0%
FTN 3.41 98% 94% 93% 95% 94%
Table 3: Comparison of FTN with different adversarial example generating methods
RMSD Inception-v3 Resnet-18 Resnet-50 Densenet Clarifai.com
Universal 16.25 63% 56% 41% 51% 12%
FTN 5.68 92% 88% 87% 91% 86%
Table 4: Comparison of universal attacks
the source image to escape from its original boundary (non-
targeted attack) or pass trough another specific boundary
(targeted attack). We call the vector perturbation. Since
these learning methods attempt to find the smallest vector to
make the attack successful, these vectors are highly related
to the victim model’s classification boundary.Moosavi et al.
[15] took them as the normal vectors from the source image
point to the boundary. However, although the classification
boundary learned by the different models shared some sim-
ilarities (which make some high-frequency adversarial ex-
amples are transferable to some extent), the curvature of the
different boundaries can’t be the same. That causes some
high-frequency adversarial examples fail to transfer or have
to magnify the perturbation to transfer.
Our method decouples the perturbation from the cur-
vature of the boundary surface. Note learning a high-
frequency fooling image is finding a point that is classified
to the targeted class but which may be sensitive to the differ-
ence of the different classification models’ boundaries. And
learning a low-frequency fooling image is finding a point
that is still classified to the targeted class but less sensitive
to the different models’ boundaries. We speculate that is
because the low-frequency fooling images are closer to the
nature image manifold. And the classification boundaries
are trained to be more robust to the nature images than the
meaningless noise, since the training datasets are consisted
of the nature images. After getting Ilf , we then find the
point that is near the source image in the pixel space and
is close to Ilf in the representation space. This constraint
condition is independent of the curvature of the boundaries,
thus is expected to be more transferable than the previous
methods.
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